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This study, conducted in a medium-size federal government agency, assesses
whether readers evaluating reports written in a high-impact style make better
decisions than readers evaluating the same reports written in a bureaucratic
style that is the organization's norm. Results indicate that respondents reading
high-impact reports did not make statistically significant better decisions than
those reading bureaucratic reports. To explain these results, the study analyzes
ihe effect that organizationally-specific context factors -perceived work roles,
job design, organizational structure, report genre expectations, and organiza-
tional language norms - have on respondents' reading and interpretation
processes and attitudes toward the high-impact reports. Qualitative data show
that these context factors caused readers to perceive the high-impact reports as
abnormal discourse, thus deflecting their attention from the interpretation and
analysis of report content.
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Writing within organizations is generally a purposeful, goal-ori-ented activity (Gieselman, 1982). When generating documients,
organizational writers usually wish to achieve specific outcomes,
such as increasing readers' knowledge to improve their performance
of tasks, disseminating information so organizational memhers can
make informed decisions, persuading decision makers to approve a
particular course of action, or building rapport and gaining trust. These
outcomes are affected by readers' interpretations of a document's
linguistic, intra-textual cues. In turn, these interpretations may he
steered hy readers' constructions of their organizational environ-
ments. This reader-text-environment interaction generates a context
that influences how readers process documents to complete tasks and
achieve personal and organizational goals.
Rogers and Brown (1993) and Smeltzer and Thomas (1994) ohserve
that there is a paucity of research conducted within complex organi-
zational settings that directly investigates the relationship between
writing style and readers' relative abilities to comprehend and use infor-
mation to complete complex organizational tasks. This study, conducted
in a medium-size federal government agency, examines whether
readers interpreting reports written in what Fielden and Dulek (1987,
1990) call a "high-impact" (HI) style - a style that communication
researchers claim reflects effective writing- make hetter decisions than
readers interpreting the same report written in a hureaucratic, low-
impact (LI) style that is the organization's norm. To understand these
readers' report interpretation processes, their decisions, and their atti-
tude toward the HI and LI reports, this research examines organiza-
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tional context factors: perceived work roles, job design, organiza-
tional structure, report genre expectations, and organizational lan-
guage norms. In particular, the study focuses on how readers working
in an organization with well-established language norms react to
and assess reports that differ significantly from those norms in orga-
nization, style, and document design- resulting in what Rorty (1989)
and Bruffee (1984) call abnormal organizational discourse. Although
the HI reports are theoretically easier to understand, this new, "ahnor-
mal" discourse may challenge organizational knowledge about what
an effective report is and deflect attention from interpretation and
analysis of report content, thus affecting readers' assessments of the
report.
Literature Review
As Rogers and Brown (1993) and Smeltzer and Thomas (1994) have
pointed out, limited research exists on the relationship between writ-
ing style and organizational effectiveness as defined hy reader-hased,
organizationally specific outcome measures. Both practical and epis-
temological factors account for this paucity of research. First, doing
research within complex organizational settings is time-consuming, an
important consideration for junior faculty who must produce a sig-
nificant numher of articles to please tenure committees and review
hoards. Another practical prohlem is that gaining access to organiza-
tions can he difficult, particularly for researchers in departments that
lack close ties to the business community. Furthermore, the research
methods this work often requires - for example, participant observa-
tion, semi-structured interviews, and protocol analysis - themselves
require suhstantial organizational support to gather, transcribe, code,
and analyze data. Second, and more importantly, many business com-
munication researchers, still influenced (often tacitly) by the Shannon-
Weaver communication model and its many outgrowths, unwittingly
continue to locate the source of writing effectiveness in the document
itself or readers' reactions to the document rather than in the complex
interplay of document, reader, and the organizational context that
strongly influences readers' interpretive practices.
Researchers' continued use of readability formulas to evaluate
document effectiveness indicates the dominance of this tacit mental •
model that the document is the locus of effective writing and that a
metric can be used to determine if the document is comprehensible
and useable (Campbell & HoUmann, 1985; Courtis, 1987; Haar & Kos-
sack, 1990; Heath & Phelps, 1984; Schroeder & Gibson, 1990). In
fact, researchers have even attempted to correlate the readability of
a company's annual reports with its financial performance (Courtis,
1986; Jones, 1988; Subramanian, Insley, & Blackwell, 1993). These stud-
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ies continue despite the large body of research that disputes their value
(Selzer, 1981; Stevens, Stevens, & Stevens, 1992; Suchan & Colucci,
1989). Shelby (1992) best summarizes researchers' misgivings about
these formulas' value: Readability skeptics believe that formulas tap
superficial characteristics of documents; that statistical methodolo-
gies are inappropriate for studying writing effects on readers in com-
plex organizational systems; that formulas may correlate with
comprehensibility, but they do not predict comprehension ease or
difficulty; and that readability is an internal construct existing in the
mind of the reader.
Even researchers (Karlinsky & Koch, 1983; Martindale, Koch, & Kar-
linsky, 1992; Suchan & Colucci, 1989) who have shifted the source of
where comprehension is located from the document to the reader have
used laboratory and pseudo-laboratory settings that remove readers'
interactions with documents from the rich organizational contexts that
shape document interpretation and use. In essence, what Chin (1994)
has called "context of use" is missing from these studies: how the reader
and the organization are going to use the document, the reader's
interaction with the organizational environment and the influence it
has on how the document is read, and the eflfect of prior docucaents
on the reading and use of the current document.
A cadre of business communication researchers have begun to
realize the significant influence that social and organizational contexts
have on writing and in turn how writing influences and helps struc-
ture these contexts. Faigley (1985,1986) and Spilka (1993), among oth-
ers, have been partially successful in wrenching writing research
away from well-entrenched textual and individual reader perspectives
through their explication of how writing and reading can be under-
stood only from a social/organizational rather than individual per-
spective. As Blyler and Thralls (1993) observe, this social perspective
rejects the "windowpane" theory of language - that words gain mean-
ing through their correspondence to objects in the world and hence
through language we can accurately "see" the world - and instead roots
meaning in the complex interplay of the individual existing within a
set of interlocking communities (social, organizational, and spiri-
tual/religious) that have constructed and maintained linguistic norms.
This social/organizational framework for examining technical and
business writing has begun to lead researchers into organizations to
understand how organizational and subgroup language norms steer
writing behavior and, implicitly, meaning making and knowledge
creation for organizational readers (see Blyler & Thralls, 1993, and
Suchan, 1995, for an overview of this literature). Many of these stud-
ies have examined how discourse norms shape organizational writ-
ing behavior (Brown & Herndl, 1986; Devitt, 1991; Doheny-Farina, 1989;
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Freed & Broadhead, 1987; Hagge & Kostelnick, 1989; Odell, 1985;
Rogers, 1989). These studies, though, have not examined specific out-
comes produced hy organizational readers' responses to documents,
and the effects, if any, that different organizational, stylistic, and
document design characteristics have on these outcomes.
Several studies do suggest that written communication plays a con-
tributing role in determining broad-based organizational outcomes.
Doheny-Farina's (1991) case study of entrepreneur Bill Alexander's cre-
ation and selling of a husiness plan persuading people to invest in his
fledgling company and attracting employees to it demonstrates how
a document can define and maintain an organization. Doheny-Farina
implies that the outcome of the text is the company; however, he is
careful to point out that Alexander's oral communication skills, mar-
keting timing, geographical location, and a number of other external
factors were important moderating variables instrumental in helping
him create the company.
Barabas (1990) studied an R & D organization to determine whether,
when presented with the same progress report, a subordinate and
his/her supervisor would similarly identify the report's most impor-
tant versus least important information. What makes Barabas's work
distinctive is that she embeds her experimental task within the cul-
ture and the information expectation norms of the organization. Pbr-
thermore, she has a pseudo-outcome measure of report effectiveness:
supervisors' perceptions of report effectiveness. In short, her study tries
to situate writing effectiveness not in micro-level features of texts but
within the interplay of writer, text, reader, and context. However,
Barabas's examination of context is rather limited: She uses the
catch-all concept of culture rather than examining the contextual deter-
minants that create culture - structure, structuration processes, job
role and design, power relationships, control systems, and so on.
Herndl, Fennell, and Miller's (1991) study of the Three-Mile Island
and shuttle Challenger disasters focuses on miscommunication gen-
erated by different discourse norms that organizational subgroups have
developed. Specifically, these researchers examined how different
conceptual frameworks of organizational subgroups made it difficult
for members of one group to persuade another to change nuclear
power plant procedures, or, in the case of the Challenger disaster, to
examine damaged 0-rings on the shuttle booster and delay launch
because cold weather compromised 0-ring integrity. The implied out-
come measure - the inability to persuade which contributed to dis-
astrous consequences - was not so much influenced by a general lack
of writing and argumentative skills but by the subgroups' different con-
ceptions of knowledge, the perceived roles they were forced to play out
because of their subgroup membership, and the differences in subgroup
power because of organizational roles.
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Dorothy Winsor (1990) also analyzes how managers' and engineers'
different views of knowledge affected the decision to launch the Chal-
lenger despite cold temperatures that could compromise the 0-rings'
ability to seal. To explain why NASA ignored warnings about 0-ring
limitations, she argues that knowing is an interpretive act shaped by
empiricai evidence and social, contingent factors. Knowledge is not
merely the transmission of evidence (communication as a conduit) to
support recommendations; instead, both evidence and the knowl-
edge generated from it are shaped by social factors. Because Winsor's
study is primarily an essay on epistemology and communication, she
examines the Challenger launch outcome from a macro-organiza-
tional perspective. This perspective does not enable her to examine
carefully the interplay between 0-ring reports and the discussion of
those reports, readers, and audiences, and the organizational contexts
that generated different interpretations of 0-ring data. Context fac-
tors would include the Marshall Space Center's need to generate
other business (e.g., Skylab, the Space Shuttle, the Hubble telescope)
to increase resources cut after the completion of the Apollo project;
the large, highly differentiated bureaucracy created to manage these
projects; and the climate of fear and "results at all costs" created by
Marshall Space Center director George Lucas (the debate about 0-ring
data never reached the top-ievel NASA management who decided to
launch the Challenger). These context factors helped polarize engi-
neers from managers, thus contributing to a lack of shared under-
standing that resulted in the groups' interpreting 0-ring data
differently.
Two recent studies directly focus on the relationship between writ-
ing style and organizational outcomes. Rogers and Brown's (1993)
study of organizational members' compliance with instructions exam-
ines whether readers used the document as the writer intended.
Respondents were instructed to obtain study materials before they
attended a training program. Rogers and Brown found that subjects
who received instructions written in the high-impact style complied
with those instructions at a statistically significant higher rate than
those who received instructions written in a bureaucratic stsde.
Although they conducted their research in a field setting using sub-
jects performing an actual organizational task, the task was neither
very important nor cognitively complex. Furthermore, Rogers and
Brown were primarily concerned with the relationship between doc-
uments written in different styles and their outcome measures; con-
sequently, they did not examine context factors such as organizational
language norms, the history of prior instructions, time constraints, the
power relation between the writer and readers, and readers' percep-
tions of the instructions' importance.
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Daniel (1995) examined old (hureaucratic) and new-style form let-
ters sent to veterans to determine if the more user-friendly letters
increased hoth rate and timeliness of response, resulted in more com-
plete responses, and decreased the numher of calls to clarify letter con-
tent. Daniel's results were mixed. Although the new-style letters did
decrease the numher of calls to clarify letter content, these letters nei-
ther increased response rate nor resulted in more complete responses.
In fact, the response timeliness was hetter for the old-style than the
new-style letters. Unfortunately, Daniel did not use statistical mea-
sures to determine if there were significant differences in her results.
Because the letters were external, she was unable to assess reader con-
text factors that would help us understand their responses to the let-
ters. Finally, the study encountered significant research design
prohlems that may have compromised its results.
Research Questions and Issues
This study addresses four research questions:
1. Do Report Assessors (RAs) reading HI reports make hetter decisions
than RAs assessing the same reports written in a LI hureaucratic
style that is the organization's norm?
2. Does report content (i.e., report treatment) affect RAs' decision qual-
ity when assessing the HI and LI reports?
3. Does RAs' work location affect their assessment of the HI and LI
reports?
4. Does organizational context affect RAs' perception and interpretation
of HI and LI reports and their decisions?
Unlike previous research, this study uses professionals perform-
ing at their joh sites cognitively complex report-reading and decision-
making tasks whose results affect people's lives. Furthermore, it
examines an array of organization, style, and document design text
characteristics (discussed below) that prior research indicates improve
document comprehension to determine if these characteristics help
readers "use" reports to make hetter quality decisions. Finally, to under-
stand RAs' report-reading processes and their decisions, this study
examines the potential infiuence of organizational context: perceived
work roles, job design, organizational structure, report genre expec-
tations, and organizational language norms.
In essence, this research tries to bridge the work of researchers focus-
ing on the interplay of document with readers with the work of social
constructionists who see readers' responses to documents emhedded
in interpretive communities. This linkage should provide insight into
the complex interplay among text characteristics, reader responses,
and organizational contexts.
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The Organization, its Structure, and its Tasics
This study was conducted at a medium-size federal government
agency (approximately 3,200 employees) with multiple locations. To
protect confidentiality, information about the organization and its mem-
bers will remain somewhat vague. The organization's primary respon-
sibility is to determine whether civilian and military personnel who
perform sensitive tasks for the government should be given access to
proprietary information. These decisions are extremely important
because denial of information access can end an individual's career.
The agency is a traditional, functionally organized bureaucracy; it
is hierarchically structured with five levels of reporting relation-
ships separating low-level Report Assessors (RAs) and Information
Gatherers (IGs) from top-level management. RAs and IGs work in
different functions with no lateral linkages.
The organization is mechanistic not only in structure but also in
attitude: "Getting out the product" and "turning cases" quickly char-
acterize management's attitude toward work. Work backlogs caused
by budget and staff cuts as well as the threat of reorganization have
heightened this "get-out-the-product" mentality.
This study focuses on senior Report Assessors (RAs) at multiple sites
who daily determine, based solely on written reports they receive,
whether subjects whose past actions have raised questions of trust
should be granted access to proprietary information. These RAs aver-
aged 13 years of experience with the range being 7 to 23 years.
Ifypically, senior RAs read reports that are at least 20-25 P^ges and,
at times, 50 pages long. They read 4-6 hours a day in relatively small,
partitioned offices located in large office "bull pens."
Information Gatherers (IGs) working in various offices throughout
the United States write these reports. IGs average 5-7 years less expe-
rience with the agency than senior RAs. IGs' primary job is to inter-
view subjects and people knowledgeable about these subjects' work
and personal histories. This information is then communicated in writ-
ten reports to a Report Coordination office. This office then transfers
these reports to the appropriate report assessment office. Preidous
research has reported IGs' experience levels, report writing tasks, and
report composing processes (Suchan, 1995).
RAs do not receive information about subjects from briefings, tele-
phone conversations, meetings, or personal interviews; instead, IGs' writ-
ten reports provide the only information EAs have. Based solely on these
reports, EAs recommend whether subjects will be granted or denied
access to proprietary information. Because decisions are based solely
on written information, we can determine if differences in report orga-
nization, style, and document design affect decision making.
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All "deny access" decisions are reviewed by the RAs' supervisors.
These supervisors, former RAs themselves, have proven that they are
extremely skilled at interpreting report information and determin-
ing whether access to proprietary information should be granted.
If RAs feel reports do not contain sufficient information to make a
decision, they can request further information. However, these requests
for additional information slow down the assessment process, gener-
ate case backlogs that make RAs and their supervisors look bad, and
place added burdens both on the IGs who must re-interview people and
on their supervisors who must find the resources to support these re-
interviews.
Theoretically, RAs are required to use very specific criteria contained
in a policy and procedure manual to guide their decisions. Despite this
decision-making constraint, senior RAs' report assessment tasks are
challenging because the reports they assess are not only long but also
filled with complex financial, personal, and workplace performance infor-
mation. This complex report content requires careful comprehension
and interpretation of information before applying the appropriate
decision criteria. In short, the complexity of RAs' jobs is located pri-
marily in the reading, understanding, and interpreting of report infor-
mation rather than simply applying the decision criteria. This task
complexity enables this study to determine if differences in report orga-
nization, style, and document design affect RAs' decisions.
Research Design
This study used a three-stage data gathering process. Stage One
determined if RAs had difficulty reading and interpreting reports,
located the specific document characteristics that caused difficulty,
and provided insight into RAs' current reading and decision-making
processes and the organizational contexts in which these processes
take place. This information was obtained from participant observa-
tion, protocol analysis, and semi-structured group interviews.
Stage Two determined if there were statistically significant
differences in RA decision quality based on differences in report orga-
nization, style, and document design. These data show whether RAs
make better decisions when reading HI reports or reports written in
the current bvireaucratic (LI) style.
Stage Three used brief (15- to 35-minute) semi-structured inter-
views immediately after RAs completed Stage Two to determine RAs'
general attitude toward the HI report treatments and the effect they
believed these reports would have on their job tasks and roles.
Stage One Research Design
I conducted group interviews with twelve RAs and talk-aloud pro-
tocols with six RAs from two work sites located in the Washington,
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DC area. These sites were chosen for two reasons: a cross-represen-
tation of the senior RA population worked there and senior manage-
ment had determined previously that RAs assessed typical cases at
these sites. Senior management at each site chose the RAs to be
interviewed based on RA experience and availability. These RAs had
not worked as a team; consequently, their responses could not be
affected by groupthink. I chose RAs to protocol who typically worked
on cases like the ones I used for this study.
Six open-ended questions were prepared for the group interviews.
These questions were designed as prompts to generate discussion
among RAs about how they read and analyzed IG reports. Follow-up
questions were asked only to clarify RA statements. The group inter-
views (six RAs per group) were tape-recorded, and each lasted approx-
imately two hours. In addition, the "24-hour rule" was followed for these
interviews. This required that detailed interview notes and impres-
sions be completed within one day of the interview.
The six talk-aloud protocols (three at each site and one protocol per
RA) were conducted while RAs read and assessed actual reports. These
protocols not only served as a check to corroborate information obtained
during the group interviews (often there is a difference between
espoused processes and processes in use) but also provided a richer
understanding of RAs' report reading habits (e.g., front to back, back
to front, section by section, etc.); their interpretations of report con-
tent and the difficulties, if any, they had in interpreting that content;
their perceptions of the relative readability of the reports; and based
on their interpretations of report content, the decisions they made. The
RAs protocoled were promised anon3niiity. RA quotes are used frequently
to reveal metaphors that convey the tone of their responses.
Stage Two Report Treatments
Since RAs had difficulty assessing reports they currently read, the
next step was to determine empirically if changes in report organi-
zation, style, and document design affected RA decision quality. Rep-
resentative reports in organization, style, document design, and
content were chosen for RAs to assess. To choose representative
reports, I examined the organization's own assessment-of-report-con-
tent studies to determine typical report issues, relative complexity of
issues, and average report length. These internal studies revealed that
reports read by senior RAs were generally complex, contained mul-
tiple issues, and usually were over 20 pages long.
I obtained and carefully read 55 completed reports from the orga-
nization's report clearing house. I chose two reports that best met the
agency's typical report profile: "Czarnek" and "Rokitka." (The pseu-
donyms chosen do not reflect subjects' ethnic backgrounds.) Because
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these reports contain sensitive personal information, I can provide only
limited information about their content. The Czarnek report is 30 pages
long, the Rokitka report 26 pages. Both reports were typical of agency
reports in organization, document design, and style.
I prepared high-impact (HI) treatments of the Czarnek and Rokitka
reports, using the RAs' comments ahout their report reading difficul-
ties and the results from the protocols to determine the specific doc-
ument characteristics (the independent variahles in this study) to
revise. Furthermore, I conducted a thorough literature review to
insure that each of the independent variahles used in revising the low-
impact (LI) reports contrihuted to reading efficiency (see list below).
Great care was taken during revision to insure that the content of
the original reports was not changed. Usage errors were included in
the revised reports hecause usage was not a variable heing manipu-
lated. Two experienced (senior-level administrators) RAs carefully
reviewed the revised reports to determine whether report content
matched that of the originals. They stated there were no differences
in content, though the reports "looked" different due to major changes
in document design.
In the revised reports, I altered seven report characteristics:
1. Paragraph Length. Paragraphs were no longer than 3-4 sentences;
one-sentence paragraphs were used to emphasize important infor-
mation (Felker, Redish, & Peterson, 1985).
2. Headings and Subheadings. Major headings and subheadings were
used to telegraph major sections of relevant information (Redish,
1989).
3. Lists and Bullets. These graphic aids highlighted significant infor-
mation, broke out statistical information, and laid out complicated
chronological sequences (Benson, 1985; Rubens, 1986).
4. Internal Previews. At the beginning of long issue sections, an inter-
nal preview provided a quick overview of the major points that were
to come in that section. The language in the preview mirrored the
language in the major headings (Redish, Battison, & Gold, 1985).
5. Proximity of Subject-Verb-Object. Subjects, verbs, and objects
within clauses were kept as close to each other as possible to avoid
strain on short-term memory (Fodor & Garret, 1967).
6. Active Verhs. When appropriate, passive verbs were changed to active
verbs to make clear who the agent of a particular action was (Mirel,
1988; Selzer, 1983).
7. Explicit Transitional Tags. Clear temporal transitional tags such as
"after" and "next," often left out in narrative report writing, were
added to make it easier for readers to quickly grasp relationships
between ideas and sections of reports (Guillemette, 1987).
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These changes made the revised reports reflect most of the stylis-
tic characteristics that Fielden and Dulek (1987, 1990) call high
impact (HI) writing. The original reports, called low impact (LI),
reflect the organization's stylistic norms.
Sample and Demographics for Stages Two and Three
Forty senior RAs from the four major report assessment centers par-
ticipated in the study. Senior-level managers at each site chose their
best RAs for the study; consequently, any differences in decision qual-
ity should not be attributed to different skill levels among RAs. The
number of RAs from each site is listed below:
• Ohio 12
• Washington, DC 12
• Maryland 12
• Virginia 4
A iarge report backlog prevented Virginia from having more RAs
participate.
Thirty-one female and nine male RAs read the reports. Their aver-
age age was 45, and they averaged 13 years of report assessment expe-
rience. The typical RA had spent a little more than six years at the
report assessment site.
Stage Two Data-Gathering Procedures and Instrument
The RAs were tested on-site and at their work spaces. At each site
they were divided randomly into two groups with each group assess-
ing two reports.
• Group I (six EAs at each site except for Virginia) received a revised,
high-impact treatment of the Czarnek case and an original, low-
impact treatment of the Rokitka case.
•" Group II received an original, low-impact treatment ofthe Czarnek
case and a revised, high-impact treatment of the Rokitka case.
This 2x2 design guaranteed that each RA responded to one report
written in the typical, low-impact style and one in the revised high-
impact style.
lb guarantee that all RAs were given the same instructions, my on-
site assistants and I read a prepared script that explained
• The purpose of the task.
• The materials (reports and questionnaires) they were receiving.
• The process they were to use in assessing the reports and completing
the questionnaires.
All directions were reiterated on a cover sheet and in different seg-
ments ofthe test instrument. RAs were also told they could use what-
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ever materials (decision and policy manuals) they normally employed
when assessing reports. Furthermore, senior managers at each site
told RAs that they would he evaluating actual reports and that their
decisions would determine how the case would be adjudicated.
Report Assessors completed a three-part questionnaire after assess-
ing each report. This study reports only the results from Part I, which
requested information ahout the report decision, the rationale for the
decision, and the criteria used.
Quality of Report Assessor Decision
To determine the "correct" report decision, protocols were conducted
with six senior, supervisory RAs - two each from the Maryland, Wash-
ington, and Virginia report assessment sites. At each site, the 2 x 2
research design previously described was used: One-half of the RA
supervisors read the HI treatment of the Czarnek case and the LI treat-
ment of the Rokitka case; the other half read the LI treatment of the
Czarnek case and the HI treatment of the Rokitka case.
All six RA supervisors would have granted information access for
both cases. This "grant" decision was the study's measure of decision
quality.
Statistical Techniques
Chi squares were used to determine if report style affected deci-
sion outcome. A 5% confidence interval was used to determine statistical
significance. Tables contain descriptive statistics and percentages to
make clear differences in decision outcomes hetween the report treat-
ments. Several cell sizes are relatively small; consequently, the
descriptive statistics may he more revealing than some of the Chi-
square results.
Limitations
Sixty-four senior RAs worked at the four sites studied; conse-
quently, the study's sample was limited by number of organizational
members. Furthermore, since the study's decision tasks took approx-
imately three hours to complete, RA supervisors could not pull all of
their senior RAs from their johs to participate in the study. Nevertheless,
at three of the four RA sites, the numher of RAs participating in the
study represented 75% of the senior RA population. These factors
resulted in sample size difficulties that limited the study's unit of analy-
sis. Specifically, small cell sizes (n = 6) resulted when the study com-
pared report treatment and decision type among report assessment
sites. Consequently, these data are not analyzed separately hut used
only to clarify decision results from larger units of analysis - both cases
comhined and the Czarnek and Rokitka cases separately.
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Stage Three Research Design
Immediately after RAs assessed the two cases, I conducted l8
taped, semi-structured interviews (6 each from the Ohio, Washington,
and Maryland sites) to determine if external-to-the-document context
factors affected RAs' reading and assessment processes. Each inter-
view lasted 15 to 35 minutes. Again, the 24-hour rule was followed;
detailed interview notes and impressions were completed within one
day of each interview.
i?eport Assessors' Reading and Decision-Maicing
Processes
The first stage of research established a baseline by discovering how
RAs read and responded to actual reports on the job.
Group interview Results
Early in the group interviews, RAs focused on the physiological effect
of report reading. Almost all (lo of 12) of the RAs stated that they expe-
rienced eye fatigue, and several indicated that they suffered from fre-
quent headaches. Four RAs indicated that their eyeglass prescriptions
have had to be made progressively stronger over the last several
years and jokingly commented that they were "the Mr. Magoos of the
organization."
RAs attributed these symptoms to both job requirements and report
document design. As indicated earlier, RAs read complex reports 4-
6 hours a day. They also stated that the reports were "wall-to-wall
words" causing them to "search through reports to find the stuff' they
needed or to "hack through reports to find the meat." When asked to
clarifj' what they meant, the RAs responded that page after page was
filled with information: IGs neither paragraphed often nor connected
information with transitions, but merely "mind-dumped" information
on the page for RAs to sort through.
Reports are narratives organized by topic and by chronology within
each topic. More than half (7 of 12) of the RAs felt that trying to fol-
low narratives without a preview of what was to come made it difficult
to remember important information needed to make decisions. Fur-
thermore, different narrative topics had different time lines, creating
in long, complex reports a tangled sequence of events and a bewildering
number of dates that RAs had difficulty following.
RAs developed various strategies to cope with the "wall-to-wall
words," lack of previews, and tangled chronologies. They took brief notes
to put related information together, highlighted information, color coded
similar report issues, used tags with key words to trigger memory, and
re-skimmed segments several times to remember and connect infor-
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mation. RAs relished discussing the schemes they used to help them
"sift through the garbage" and "make sense of all the garhled stuff in
these reports."
The paraphrased statements and the direct quotes do not capture
the tone of the RAs' comments. They were not angry with the IGs or
annoyed hy their writing style; they were merely descrihing the joh
challenges or job task requirements that report reading and assess-
ment created. As one RA put it, working hard to read reports "comes
with the territory."
Results from Report Assessor Protocols
Six RAs were protocoled while assessing reports hoth to understand
their reading processes, interpretations of report content, and assess-
ment decisions and also to corroborate group interview results. Once
RAs quickly scanned reports to insure they contained the required inter-
views, they read the reports idiosyncratically. They did not necessarily
start at the heginning and read to the end. Most RAs "trolled" through
the reports looking for large hlocks of information that were more than
mere boilerplate. For example, one RA read from back to front because,
as he pointed out, most of the "good stuff' tends to he in the hack of
the report. In contrast, another RA read from front to hack to get a
hetter sense of what was in the report and to determine where she
needed to focus her energy. When RAs found the "good stuff," all read
very carefully (word hy word).
When RAs found important information to read, the protocols
revealed they attempted immediately to map, classify, and integrate
information into an interpretive framework that was partially formed
hy the decision criteria contained in policy and procedural manuals.
Their reading was task-oriented: they read to decide whether to grant
subjects access to proprietary information, not to learn or gather
information ahout suhjects.
These individual RA protocols corrohorated group interview com-
ments that RAs often used elahorate strategies to map and classify
information. For example, one RA, overwhelmed with large amounts
of seemingly unrelated information, resorted to careful note-taking
to sort out and classify work history, medical backgroxind, and finan-
cial information. This note-taking hecame his way of organizing and
classifying information; in essence, the RA was forced to reconstruct
the report. Another RA used six differently-colored highlighters - one
for each major issue she might encounter in a report — when reading.
Laughingly referring to herself as the "rainbow girl," she felt her color-
coding scheme helped her digest information and make high quality
decisions.
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This difficulty in sorting and classifying report information surfaced
regularly. However, not one of the RAs protocoled expressed annoy-
ance while reading these "non-reader-friendly" reports. The RAs
viewed these characteristics as the norm because they had encoun-
tered them so frequently. In fact, the RAs appeared to relish their detec-
tive work and seemed to lose themselves in their work despite being
protocoled.
The RAB' struggle to mentally map and classify information could
result in their reading the same information differently. These different
readings of basic information could lead to varied interpretations of
the report, causing RAs to rule differently on the same case. For
example, the protocols revealed that agent-deleted passive con-
structions and the separation of the subject from the main verb forced
RAs to guess who the agent was for particular actions.
RAs also responded differently to the same language describing sim-
ilar issues contained in different reports. Terms like "financial irre-
sponsibility," "financial irregularity," "bankruptcy," "medical discharge,"
and so on evoked in RAs different inferences about subjects' trust-
worthiness and whether they could safeguard proprietary informa-
tion. For example, the words "bankruptcy," "past due," and "collection
agency" evoked in one RA reviewing a report containing a history of
extensive financial problems (bills referred to collection agencies, a
bankruptcy, and a current history of late payments) comments that
the subject was "irresponsible, dishonest, and would be prone to
financiai blackmail." The HA, clearly angry as he completed reading
the report, decided to recommend denial of information access and
started drafting a letter justifying the denial.
In contrast, another RA in the same facility was evaluating a report
with an almost identical financial profile, the only issue in. both
reports that the respective RAs focused on. This RA reacted neutrally
to terms like "bankruptcy," "past due," and "collection agency" and
decided to grant information access. She believed the subject had
merely fallen on "bad times" and had run into a string of bad luck.
This RA later revealed that she had recently undergone severe finan-
cial hardship - she had dealt with collection agencies, many past-due
notices, and so on - because of a change in her marital stattis.
These financial terms triggered in RAs personal rather than pro-
fessional schemata resulting in different interpretations of similar lan-
guage. This pattern of different interpretations of the same or very
similar language occurred fairly frequently during the protocols.
The RAs protocoled believed that language was objective and that
their response to it was based on professionalism. In brief discussions
with the RAs after the protocol, they stated that their job role and their
ability to immerse themselves in that role enabled them to avoid per-
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sonal bias when assessing reports. Furthermore, they stated that
they guarded against bias by using the report assessment criteria found
in their policy manual to guide their assessment of report content. How-
ever, not once during any of the six protocols did a RA refer to the pol-
icy manual.
To summarize, the group interviews and protocols indicate that the
organization's current report organization, style, and document design
made reports difficult to read. RAs had to work hard to mentally map
information so they could make well-informed decisions. Furthermore,
RAs responded differently to similar language. These different inter-
pretations of similar language and the assumptions and conclusions
about the subjects that these interpretations generated could affect
decision quality. Surprisingly, RAs were not perturbed by the current
report writing style nor did they indicate a need for change. In fact,
RAs had become very skillful in maneuvering through the reports to
find the information they needed to make a decision. They were proud
of that skill; it differentiated them from others.
The Effect of Report Styie on Decision Quaiity
Tkble 1 shows that RAs reading HI reports did not make significantly
(p = .527) better decisions than RAs reading LI reports. Report style
does not have a statistically significant effect on RA decisions when
results from both reports are combined.
The data describing this relationship are divided into two sec-
tions: the results from both cases combined and the results from the
















Notes: LI = Low Impact; HI = High Impact
Chi square (df= 2,N= 80) = 1.280, p = .527
Table 1 shows that report treatment had a limited effect on deci-
sion type and decision effectiveness: 50% of the RAs reading the low-
impact report decided to grant information access, while 63% who read
the high-impact treatments decided to grant access. This difference
was not statistically significant. As we shall see, all the decision vari-
ance occurs in RAs' responses to the Rokitka case.
It is interesting that 43% of the RAs (35 of 80 decisions) decided not
to grant information access regardless of report style. In other words.







almost half of the senior RAs made decisions that varied from those
of their superiors.
Ikhles 2 and 3 show that even when the cases are analyzed separately,
report treatment did not have a statistically significant effect on deci-
sion quality. The Czarnek case results in Tahle 2 indicate that report
style had no effect on decision quality (p = .914); in fact, decision results
in response to the LI and HI treatments are almost identical.
Table 2





Note: Chi square (df= 2,N- 40) = .178, p = .914
In the Czarnek case, 60% of the decisions, regardless of report style,
vary from those of RAs' supervisors.
Rokitka case results in Tkhle 3 show that report treatment did not
have a statistically significant effect on decision quality (P - .202). How-
ever, descriptive statistics indicate that the HI treatment improved
decision quality somewhat: 85% of RAs reading the high-impact
Sokitka report decided to grant information access, while 60% of
those reading the low-impact version decided to grant access.
Table 3





Note: Chi square (df= 2,N= 40) = 3.195, p = .202
Table 3 also shows that all the decision variance seen in the "grant"
category in Table I (hoth case treatments combined) was the result of
RAs' response to the Rokitka case. Furthermore, most of the decision
variance (4 of 5 responses) in Table 3 represented requests for addi-
tional information.
Next, data were broken down by site to determine if report treat-
ment affected decision quality at any of the three sites. At the Ohio
and Washington sites, report treatment did not affect decision qual-
ity. At Ohio, 83% (10 of 12) of RAs reading the HI treatment granted
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granted access. At Washington the grant decisions were identical -
67% or 8 of 12 - regardless of case treatment.
However, as Table 4 shows, report treatment appeared to have
some effect on Maryland RAs. These results, though, must be inter-
preted carefully because of the relatively small sample size.
Table 4
Relationship Between Decision and Treatment for





Note: Chi square {df= 2, N= 24) = 5.25,p = .072
Although not statistically significant (p = .07), the HI report treat-
ments resulted in decisions more in agreement with those of RA
superiors. Specifically, 33% of RAs reading the HI treatments granted
information access; none reading the LI counterparts granted access.
Only 8% who read the HI reports denied access, while 25% who read
the LI reports denied. Finally, 58% who read the HI reports requested
more information, and 75% who read the LI treatments needed more
information.
The data in Table 4 were disassembled to determine if either the
Czarnek or Rokitka case was the source of the decision to grant
differences. All {n = 4) the grant category differences came from Mary-
land RA responses to the Rokitka case.
The Maryland data indicate this site accounted for most of the deci-
sion variance reported in Table 1. This site's data explain 80% (4 of 5)
of the differences in grant decisions between HI and LI report treat-
ments, all of which occurred in response to the Rokitka report. Also,
this site accounts for almost 70% (16 of 23) of the decisions to request
more information.
Analysis of Decision Results
This study did not find evidence that HI report treatments lead to
better quality decisions. The data show a similarity in RAs' decision
responses to both report styles when we compare the combined deci-
sion responses to both the HI and LI reports (Table l) and the HI and
LI decision responses to the Czarnek and Rokitka cases (Tables 2 &
3). In fact, if the Maryland RAs' responses to the Rokitka case are
excluded, RA "grant" decisions are almost identical regardless of
report treatment.
These results may seem surprising. Previous research (Suchan &
Colucci, 1989) has shown that readers better comprehend information
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in HI rather than LI documents. Also, Rogers and Brown (1993) found
that readers responding to a HI document better comply with instruc-
tions than those reading its LI counterpart. Theoretically, better
information comprehension should lead to higher-quality task com-
pletion, particularly for tasks whose primary demand is the reading
and interpreting of information. If RAs can more easily "retrieve" infor-
mation from HI rather than LI reports, then they should have less
difficulty applying decision criteria to case information. The result
should be quality assessment decisions. Consequently, reports that are
efficient to read (the HI treatments) should yield better quality deci-
sions than those that tax readers' information processing capabilities
(the LI treatments).
Furthermore, my Stage One qualitative research showed that RA.s had
difficulty mapping and classifying report information because of the way
it was written and organized. The customary LI style forced RAs to work
hard to mentally map and classify information which caused them to
misread information and thus inaccurately assess a report.
Given previous research, the RAs' interview results, and the com-
mon-sense expectation that efficient HI reports should result in bet-
ter quality decision, why did the data reveal, except at the Maryland
site, non-significant results? At least five explanations are possible.
All of these explanations focus on the role that organizational context
plays in shaping how RAs process report information and their per-
ception of the HI report treatments.
1. RAs' background knowledge enabled them to generate mental and
physical templates to process information.
2. RAs perceived the HI treatments as abnormal, aberrant discourse.
3. RAs believed that the HI report style usurped RAs' job roles by giv-
ing too much authority to IGs.
4. RAs felt threatened by the HI report because they perceived that
it reduced task complexity and their organizational value.
5. The cognitive complexity of the RAs' tasks required interpreting and
analyzing report information rather than merely understanding it.
Report Assessors Used Templates to Process Information.
Since RAs averaged 13 years of report assessment experience, they
brought to this study vast amounts of background information and deci-
sion-making context gained from reading and assessing similar
reports. RAs used this extensive prior knowledge to create highly devel-
oped internal and external information-processing and interpretation
templates that helped them make sense of difficult-to-integrate infor-
mation, thus preventing cognitive overload. If RAs had not developed
these templates, they in all likelihood would have changed jobs because
the task demands would have been overwhelming.
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These templates enabled RAs to key on information that was cen-
tral to their decision-making task and to ignore information that
appeared inconsequential. This process helps constrain potential inter-
pretations of the document. RAs had perfected the art of skim reading
to find key language which then triggered a slow-down in their read-
ing processes. They often stated they could "feel" or "had hunches" about
what was coming next in a report. Also, as we have seen, RAs used a
variety of fairly sophisticated and humorous mechanical means to sort
and organize information such as short-hand note-taking, color coding
different types of information, unique symbols to classify information,
and different sizes and types of "stick ups" to locate information. In fact,
RAs were proud of the creative ways they devised to simplify their read-
ing processes and willingly shared their techniques with other senior
RAs and junior RAs whom they were mentoring.
These internal and external templates may function similarly to the
external templates (descriptive headings, internal previews, etc.) that
the HI treatments provide to simplify the processing of information.
As a result, the RAs' individually devised templates may have offset
the advantages of the HI treatments; consequently, there would be lit-
tle difference in decision response between the two treatments. In
essence, the characteristics of the HI case treatments may have
merely been external manifestations of what the RAs were already
doing to map and categorize information.
HI Treatments Were Perceived as Abnormal Discourse.
The Stage Three interviews revealed that the uniqueness of the HI
report treatments served as another context factor that influenced RA
report assessment. To the RAs, these reports looked and seemed
different from their LI counterparts. This difference bothered them,
as the following RA comments indicate:
• The report didn't look the way it should. . . . it threw me off.... it wasn't
what I expected. . . . I hadn't seen a report that looked like that hefore.
• The new report style doesn't represent the way we do things around here.
• Those new style of reports were written by outsiders; IGs don't write that
waj^ . . . they [the reports] seem fake.
• Who wrote those reports? IGs? I don't think so unless they've gone
through some new kind of training.
The LI reports represent a long-standing genre of narrative report
writing organization, style, and document design. The experienced RAs
expected information presentation to conform to these genre expec-
tations. As Rude (1995) points out, genres trigger in readers assump-
tions about how a document should be used and the nature of
knowledge within that document. Furthermore, genres steer readers'
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approach to interpretation and knowledge construction. Because the
HI reports violated the format and style of their narrative report genre
and thus RAs' expectations of how information should be presented
and interpreted, RAs may have been distracted and their reading and
report interpretation processes upset. The RAs' quotes suggest that
they may have paid undue attention to the atypical way report infor-
mation was presented and the significance of this presentation rather
than focusing solely on report content. Consequently, deflection of inter-
est from content in the HI reports may have subverted any informa-
tion processing advantages that the high-impact treatment maiy have
given RAs.
Hi Treatments Usurped Report Assessors' Authority.
Interview comments showed that RAs viewed this novel HI report
style as an organizational intervention that changed their job roles
and the relationship between IGs and RAs. More than half of the RAs
interviewed stated that the HI treatment made it appear as if the IGs
were assessing the reports and taking on a new, more active role in
the information assessment process. In fact, several RAs were incensed.
They angrily pointed out that IGs assessing reports violated organi-
zational rules:
• You can't have IGs do interviews and interpret the results.
• The IGs who wrote those [high-impact] reports don't know what they're
doing - they're trying to do our jobs, too! That can't go on!
• Those Piigh-impact] reports broke with policy. . . . IGs can't make deci-
sions about the information they got.
As we have seen, organizational structure and culture demand
that IGs' and RAs' job roles remain separate - IGs gather information
and RAs assess that information. Moreover, because of rumors of
centralization of assessment facilities and possible job cutbacks, RAs
were keenly attuned to any changes that seemed to shift job respon-
sibility or made their jobs less demanding and hence easier to do. One
RA commented: "With, a couple months of training, new guys off the
street [newly hired RAs] would be able to assess these new type
reports."
HI Treatments Reduced Task Complexity and Perceived
Organizational Vaiue.
Senior RAs took pride in their ability to unravel complex reports
and make quality assessments. That ability differentiated them from
junior, less experienced RAs, helped make their job tasks seem mean-
ingful, and provided them with a sense of pride and professional
identity. During the Stage One and Stage Three interviews, RAs stated
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that "it takes patience and talent to figure out these reports," "it took
me seven years to learn to do this well," and "there are very few peo-
ple who can do this [assess reports] like I can."
The HI report treatments may have created in RAs the perception
that the highly developed report reading and assessment skills they
had developed were no longer needed. One RA summed up other RAs'
feelings well when she said, "while reading this new [high-impact] ver-
sion, I didn't need my sticky tabs and colored markers. . . . Those lit-
tle things are the tricks of the trade."
Complex Tasks Require Report Interpretation and Analysis.
Finally, the complexity of the RAs' task may explain the lack of sta-
tistically significant differences in decision qualify between report treat-
ments. Determining whether a subject should have access to proprietary
information requires more than merely comprehending report infor-
mation. RAs must also interpret that information, using appropriate
assessment criteria and guidelines contained in manuals and policy
statements. Furthermore, from their assessment of report contexts
(what some RAs call "lifting the smoke") RAs can determine if there
are mitigating circumstances that infiuence subjects' behaviors and
justify applying the criteria more loosely. It is possible that the HI report
treatments improved report comprehension, though we have no data
to support this assertion because comprehension was not an outcome
measure. However, the data indicate that the HI treatments did not
influence the constellation of factors - comprehension, interpretation,
and analysis - that affect decision outcomes for cognitively complex
tasks.
Why Report Assessors' Decisions Varied from Their
Supervisors'
The data raise one question which, while outside the purview of this
study, is still puzzling: Why is there a 44% variance (see Tkble 1) between
RAs' decisions and those of their supervisors? There are two plausi-
ble explanations. First, the RAs may have assessed these cases more
carefully and have been more tentative in their decisions because of
the uniqueness of the HI treatments and the presence of the researcher:
Most of the variance (29%) occurred in the "request for more infor-
mation" outcome. In short, the RAs may have felt they were being scru-
tinized, though they never mentioned this feeling in the
post-assessment interviews.
Second, most of the decision variance occurred at the Maryland site:
57% of the total variance (20 of 35 non-grant decisions) and almost
70% (16 of 23) of the variance in the "request for more information"
category. Context factors at Maryland help explain its decision
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responses. Because a separate study wiil analyze the complex reasons
for Maryland results, only a brief overview of that analysis follows.
Organizational controls in the form of published report assessment
guidelines, supervisory training, and shared organizational values (e.g.,
RAs believe their work is important and must be done carefully) help
standardize how RAs should interpret reports. However, these con-
trols may not be strong enough to counteract other site-specific fac-
tors that influence how RAs interpret report information. During the
qualitative interviews of Stages One and Three, Maryland RAs, unlike
those at the other sites, spoke of using the "whole-person approach"
to assess issues in reports. When pressed to define this approach, which
is not organizationally sanctioned, and explain how it is opera-
tionalized, the Maryland RAs were unable to do so. However, all
Maryland RAs interviewed stated they used this "whole-person"
approach to assess report information and make decisions. Conse-
quently, Maryland site RAs may interpret the same cases differently
because they have constructed what Smith (1978) calls a different the-
ory ofthe worid (in this case, the assessment world) for their community
Conclusions
This study's results question the common-sense notion that
"efficient" reports represented by high-impact organization, style,
and document design are more effective. Overall, RAs reading the HI
reports did not make better decisions (the effectiveness measure)
than their counterparts reading the LI treatments. Report treatment
did not have a significant effect on decision quality. Virtually all vari-
ance for the "grant" decision involved Maryland RAs' assessment of
the Rokitka case.
The study's qualitative data indicate that an array of complex,
extemal-to-the-document contextual factors affected RAs' attitudes
toward the high-impact reports, their perceptions of the reports'
effectiveness, and ultimately their uses of them and the outcomes from
those uses. Specifically, the interplay of job roles, job satisfaction as
a result of task complexity and autonomy, fear of downsizing due to
centralization, and report genre expectations and discourse commu-
nity norms generated a unique context that affected RAs' assess-
ments of the HI case treatments. A document's perceived value and
most importantly the organizational outcome from its use are con-
tingent on factors outside of the document's design, organization,
and style.
These results suggest that we need to seriously re-examine the the-
oretical frameworks that guide research and the assumptions that shape
teaching in business and managerial writing. Although business and
managerial communication researchers have stated for years that
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meaning exists in readers and is contingent on situational factors, much
of the field's research (particularly presentations at annual and
regional conferences), as the literature review demonstrates, contin-
ues to be acontextual, focusing on determining which document char-
acteristics will always result in "clear," efficient, and effective writing.
Clarity is generally perceived as an absolute, objective, acontextual
gauge of a document's value (Suchan & Dulek, 1990).
Bowden's (1993) observation that we depict documents as "con-
tainers" which we put meaning "into" and extract meaning "out of"
helps explain why much business writing reseai-ch continues to be acon-
textual, focusing primarily on documents and backgrounding read-
ers, the organizational tasks they are performing, and the organizational
communities in which they are situated. The document-as-container
metaphor implicitly focuses attention on the document, not context,
and implies that the writer is the "maker" of meaning and that mean-
ing is located or fixed within the document. The reader, then, merely
enters or accesses the document to extract meaning from it; the qual-
ity of the document as container (the measure of document effective-
ness) determines how easily the reader can access that meaning.
This document-as-container metaphor so dominates everyday language
that researchers may overlook not only how it shapes perceptions and
talk ahout documents hut also the research designs used to assess doc-
ument effectiveness. This root metaphor and the related metaphors it
entails infiuence thinking and research ahout written communication.
However, this study shows that documents are embedded in orga-
nizational contexts and that those contexts shape readers' responses
to the documents as much as do the features of the documents them-
selves. Furthermore, organizational contexts are a contingency. Myr-
iad factors shape these contexts and make them dynamic: structuration
processes, changes in the organization's external environment, tech-
nology, macro-level strategy, job role, task characteristics, reward sys-
tems, control systems, and so on. To enable business communication
researchers to formulate research questions that attend to the varie-
gated contextual factors that shape the ways readers perceive, inter-
pret, and use organizational documents, the field needs theoretical lenses
such as open systems thinking or ecological theory that are contingency-
hased (Suchan & Dulek, 1998). However, the language, particularly the
metaphors, we habitually use to think ahout writing may steer us into
a conceptual cul-de-sac, making it difficult for us to emhrace a contin-
gency-based framework for studying written communication.
Nystrand (1982) offers a different metaphorical conceptual scheme
to think, talk about, and study organizational writing by depicting a
document and its context as spaces or force fields. Within this system,
meaning is contingent on organizational context. Nystrand claims read-
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ers interpret documents by entering the textual space or field that writ-
ers have created and the contextual field that the reader and organi-
zation have jointly constructed. This space/field metaphor can be
extended by linking it with meaning construction. Within these fields
generated by the writer-reader-organization, meaning is not "fixed"
by a document's language but is "potential," becoming momentarily
fixed when these fields intersect at a specific moment. The point of
intersection can also be described as the place or space where read-
ers, circumscribed by their organizational and personal contexts and
expectations, construct, negotiate, or discover meaning through their
interaction with the document. Subsequent intersections can gener-
ate different meanings.
Within these force fields that contribute to meaning construction,
there may exist a number of fairly stable webs, arrays, lattices, or con-
stellations that give a field a particular texture and stability. For
example, the specific characteristics of both the high-impact and the
low-impact bureaucratic styles give information in documents par-
ticular patterns; also, the interplay of mission, organizational struc-
ture, job design, and control systems within a specific organization may
create organizational roles that cause fairly consistent reader reac-
tions to particular documents. Genre norms and even report formats
may trigger predictable responses in readers. These arrays help stan-
dardize reader interpretation and response to typical documents.
The metaphor of a document and a context as a space or field is pow-
erful yet paradoxical. Space suggests openness, a place where mean-
ing is indeterminate and thus must be mediated or negotiated. Also,
the space/field metaphor hints at paradox — the boundlessness of
space (readers' potential interpretations and uses of a document)
with constraints imposed by the text itself, prior interpretations of sim-
ilar texts, and the organizational context in which the text is created
and read. This paradox creates an interesting tension between the lim-
its of interpretation created by the text and its readers situated
within organizational language communities on the one hand and, on
the other, the potential for personal, idiosyncratic, and radical inter-
pretations.
Creating a comprehensive alternative language to think about busi-
ness and managerial writing is beyond the scope of this study. However,
the study's results raise fundamental questions about how tbe field
defines and measures effective organizational writing. For example,
1. Is writing effectiveness so situationally based that we are unable
to make meaningful generalizations about effectiveness, or do orga-
nizations share contexts that have enough in common to enable us
to create different categories of writing effectiveness?
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2. Does the language we use to think about writing cause us to ignore,
oversimplify, or generally misunderstand how organizational con-
text affects writing? Do we need a synthesis of the language of
rhetoric, linguistics, and composition theory with the language of
management, organizational behavior, and organizational theory?
3. Can we create meaningful knowledge about organizational writing
by focusing merely on documents, using students as respondents,
and ignoring outcome measures? Should organizational writing
research be grounded in specific organizations?
4. Is one of our research goals to determine if the written communi-
cation norms that evolve from organizational contexts are dys-
functional and in need of change? What measures determine
documents to be dysfunctional? What factors must change to enable
writers to create more effective documents? Where does effective-
ness reside?
This study suggests that researchers need to focus their attention
on the interactions among reader, writer, document, and situated con-
texts and the effects these interactions have on readers' interpretations
and uses of documents. To sharpen that focus, researchers require the-
oretical frameworks that emphasize meaning creation and document
use as contingent on an array of organizational context factors.
NOTES
I am grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions for revision that my
friend and colleague Ron Dulek provided on earlier drafts of this article.
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